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 Abstract :  The abundance of quantitative performance information has motivated multiple studies about how citizens 
make sense of “hard” performance data. However, research in psychology emphasizes that episodic information (e.g., 
case stories) often leaves a greater mark on citizens. This contradiction is tested using multiple experiments embedded 
in a large, nationally representative sample of Danish citizens. The results stress three differences between statistical and 
episodic data. Citizens have strong preferences for statistical data when asked to evaluate an organization. However, 
episodic information has in some instances a stronger impact on citizens’ evaluations of an organization and often is 
more emotionally engaging than statistics. Finally, when asked to immediately recall recent performance information 
about public services, citizens report more elaborate information about personalized stories and experiences than about 
statistics. Overall, the results raise questions about the ability of hard performance data to dominate and crowd out 
episodic performance information. 
 Practitioner Points 
•  Providing citizens with quantitative performance data will not automatically crowd out their reliance on 
personal experience or media case stories. 
•  Episodic experiences with public services provide a more vivid account of performance, which is more 
emotionally engaging and easier to recall for citizens. 
•  Policy makers and managers must pay closer attention to how their performance data can provide citizens 
with a more vivid and emotional account of public services to complement the often pallid statistical 
performance data. 
 Asmus Leth  Olsen 
 University of Copenhagen, Denmark 
 Human Interest or Hard Numbers? 
Experiments on Citizens’ Selection, Exposure, 
and Recall of Performance Information 
 Performance measurement is fundamentally about assigning numbers to the inputs, outputs, and outcomes of public organizations. Accordingly, 
when we refer to performance information, we imply 
 quantitative performance information. Increasingly, 
performance data are intended for the public at large. 
This trend has sparked a natural research interest 
in how citizens make sense of such numbers. Key 
experimental findings show that performance data 
clearly affect citizens’ attitudes (Bækgaard  2015 ; James 
 2011 ). Moreover, citizens draw on reference points 
for comparisons (Charbonneau and Van Ryzin  2015 ; 
Hansen, Olsen, and Bech  2015 ; James and Moseley 
 2014 ; Olsen, forthcoming), and they engage in 
motivated reasoning and draw on implicit attitudes in 
their interpretations of performance data (Bækgaard 
and Serritzlew  2016 ; Marvel  2016 ). In addition, 
simple framing effects can alter the inferences that 
citizens draw from the data (James and Van Ryzin 
 2015 ; Olsen  2013 ,  2015a ). 
 On the other hand, while the abundance of public 
performance data motivates these studies, we have 
overlooked the fact that “hard” performance data 
is only a subset of the information about public 
services that is available to citizens. In fact, empirical 
studies show that the dominant source of information 
for citizens is often the exact opposite of statistical 
numbers: “episodic” information in the form of 
informal “human interest” stories from personal 
experience, word-of-mouth accounts from friends and 
family, and case story coverage of public services in 
the media (Grosso and Van Ryzin  2011 ; Kettl  2016 ; 
Slattery and Hakanen  1994 ). That is, even in the age 
of quantitative performance information, citizens are 
still exposed to their neighbors’ experiences from the 
hospital or news stories about misconduct by a teacher 
at the local school. 
 At the managerial level, it has also been noted that 
episodic information attracts considerable attention 
(Bolman and Deal  1991 ; Kroll  2013 ; Mintzberg 
 1971 ; Moynihan  2008 ). This literature notes that 
managers often draw on “soft” information in the 
form of case stories from the news, ad hoc meetings, 
and casual observations. For instance, Mintzberg 
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argues that managers “favor verbal channels, face-to-face contact 
and telephone and, to a lesser extent, direct observation as means of 
supplementing (and often replacing) formal sources of information” 
(1973, 3). In psychology, there has been a long-standing interest 
in contrasting the effect of such “episodic” information with more 
abstract statistical information (Nisbett and Ross  1980 ). Here, 
the evidence suggests that episodic information is more potent 
than statistical information on multiple dimensions. For one, 
episodic information is generally more vivid, and vividness is an 
important determinant of evaluative impact (Nisbett and Ross 
1980; Pettus and Diener  1977 ). Second, episodic information is 
more emotionally engaging than abstract numbers (Slovic  2007 ). 
Moreover, episodic information is more easily stored in and 
retrieved from memory (Aarøe and Petersen  2013 ; Nisbett and 
Ross 1980). Taken together, existing work outside of performance 
management on episodic information calls into question the relative 
effectiveness of numerical performance information. 
 This article directly confronts this challenge and undertakes the 
first experimental test comparing how citizens rely on episodic and 
statistical information about public sector performance. The test of 
episodic and statistical data focuses on three distinct dimensions: 
selection, exposure, and recall. First, it investigates citizens’  stated 
preferences for either statistical or episodic information when asked 
to evaluate a service. Second, it tests how episodic and statistical 
information changes  evaluations of public services and induces 
different emotional responses. Third, it estimates the probability 
of  recalling episodic and statistical performance information and 
observe differences in how elaborate the recalled information is. 
 In order to do so, the analysis relies on a set of experiments 
embedded in a single survey. The survey is fielded in a large, 
nationally representative sample of the Danish population 
( n = 1,013). A nationally representative sample provides strong 
external validity in terms of generalizing the experimental findings 
to the broader public. At the same time, the experiments are simple 
and general enough to allow for replication and extension in 
different contexts and countries. 
 The findings show that numerical performance information, across 
many dimensions, is less influential than episodic descriptions of 
individual experiences with public services. On one hand, citizens 
have stronger stated preferences for statistical 
performance information, but apart from 
explicit information selections, we find that 
episodic performance information tends 
to be more potent. Citizens’ evaluations of 
public services are more strongly affected 
by episodic information, and if people are 
faced with negative information, it also elicits 
a stronger emotional response in terms of 
“compassion.” In terms of recall, citizens are 
more likely to recall episodic information, and 
their memories are more elaborate regarding 
episodic information instead of statistical information. In short, 
episodic performance information affects human minds and sticks. 
 The findings of this study have implications for future research 
and practitioners’ views of performance data. First, the findings 
indicate that although numerical performance information diffuses 
across countries, sectors, and levels of government, it will not 
automatically crowd out existing sources of episodic information. 
As practitioners and researchers, we have a task ahead of us in 
trying to understand how to balance human interest and hard 
numbers when communicating performance information to 
the public. Second, while the focus is on the effect of episodic 
and statistical information at the  citizen level, the findings have 
implications for how performance information may affect managers 
and employees as well. These implications are discussed in the 
concluding section. 
 How Statistical Performance Information Affects 
Citizens 
 Most definitions of performance measurement or performance 
information stress the importance of assigning numbers to the 
inputs, outputs, and outcomes of public organizations (Davies 
 1999 ; Hood  2007 ; James  2011 ; Moynihan  2008 ; Perrin  1998 ; 
Van Dooren, Bouckaert, and Halligan 2010). As noted by Radin, 
“There is perhaps no element within the performance measurement 
process that is more important than the reliance on numbers 
and quantitative presentation of accomplishments” (2006, 27). 
Accordingly, the numerical aspect has often been stressed as a 
potent driver that affects the perceptions, evaluations, and behavior 
of managers, employees, and citizens. At the organizational and 
managerial levels, this sentiment is captured in the notion of “what 
gets measured gets done” (Osborne and Gaebler  1992 , 146). It 
implicitly conveys the idea that performance information is able to 
crowd out other sources of unmeasured information about public 
services. Holzer and Yang note that “measurement helps to move 
the basis of decision making from personal experience to proof of 
measurable accomplishment or lack thereof” (2004, 16). However, 
numbers have also been seen as forces for unintended, albeit still 
powerful, consequences. For instance, Smith raises concerns about 
“tunnel vision,” which takes the center stage of attention “at the 
expense of unquantified aspects of performance” (1995, 284). In 
other words, numbers have the potential to crowd out the episodic 
pieces of information that remain uncounted. 
 What could explain the fact that quantitative performance 
information is successful in affecting citizens? One view is that 
the assignment of numbers to complex social outcomes has the 
advantage of absorbing potential uncertainties 
and diverging signals of the underlying data 
(March and Simon  1958 ; Moynihan  2008 ; 
Stone  2012 ). Espeland and Sauder mention 
how quantitative “information appears 
more robust and definitive than it would if 
presented in more complicated forms” (2007, 
17), and Jackson adds that “ambiguous 
concepts, however, make deceptive statistics” 
(2011, 23). The experimental work on how 
performance information affects citizens 
has also stressed the heuristic qualities of 
performance data: it helps simplify the otherwise complex task 
of evaluating whether a public organization is performing well or 
poorly (James  2011 ; James and Moseley  2014 ). Quantification also 
hints at an implicit cue about the importance of the information, as 
only important matters are worth counting (Stone  2012 , 192). An 
 Citizens’ evaluations of pub-
lic services are more strongly 
aﬀ ected by episodic informa-
tion, and if people are faced 
with negative information, it 
also elicits a stronger emotional 
response in terms of “compas-
sion.” 
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extension of this argument stresses the scientific cues of performance 
numbers: “Numbers generated by sophisticated statistical techniques 
can give a false sense of objectivity and reliability” (Jackson  2011 , 
24). In contrast to anecdotes or personal experience, numbers seem 
more objective and have a more decisive nature (Herbst  1993 ). 
 From social psychology, we know that precision—even when 
unwarranted—can be very persuasive because it carries implicit cues 
about the knowledge of the communicator (Zhang and Schwarz 
 2013 ). In other words, if we assign a number to the performance 
of an organization, we communicate to the world that we have 
highly accurate information about that organization ’ s performance 
(Olsen  2015b ). 1 Stone also notes how “numbers, by seeming to 
be so precise, help bolster authority of those who count” (2012, 
196). Taken together, we encounter a view in which numbers 
seem objective, unambiguous, and precise to the receiver of the 
information. We predict that these qualities are important when 
citizens engage in  explicit information selection. That is, cues about 
simplicity, objectivity, importance, and accuracy will make statistics 
more appealing in direct comparison with episodic information, 
which usually scores lower on these dimensions. This realization 
leads us to our first hypothesis:
 Hypothesis 1 : When making deliberate decisions about what 
information to engage with, citizens are more likely to select 
statistical information over episodic information. 
 However, as we will discuss in the following section, there are 
good reasons to believe that statistical performance information—
for citizens—will be less persuasive in actual evaluations, less 
emotionally engaging, and more difficult to recall. 
 How Episodic Performance Information Affects Citizens 
 There has been little to no systematic attempt to compare the effects 
of episodic and statistical performance information. Even so, we can 
trace a concern about the ability of numbers to impact citizens in 
the very early works on performance reporting. Clarence Ridley is 
well known for his extensive work on municipal and city reporting 
from the 1920s and onward. He had an eye for the attractiveness 
of vivid episodic information and called for the importance of 
“human interest treatment of other-wise dull factual data” (Ridley 
 1937 , 113). Others were also fundamentally concerned with the 
ability of statistics to engage citizens and noted how most city 
reports were “dull, statistics-impregnated affairs” (Roher  1941 , 196). 
However, while the fundamental division between the two forms of 
information exists and dates back to the early days of performance 
management, we have to turn to communication studies and 
political psychology to find studies that test and compare their 
impact on citizens. 
 In these neighboring fields, the contrast 
to numbers is reflected in the focus on 
“episodic” information versus “thematic” 
(e.g., statistical or abstract) information. 2 
Communication research has a natural 
interest in episodic information because 
cases and exemplars are central to modern 
mass-media journalism. The main difference 
between episodic and statistical information 
lies in their degree of vividness (Pettus and Diener  1977 ). Episodic 
information is highly vivid, for it draws on “personalized case 
histories,” while statistical information deals with “abstract 
concepts and general trends” (Iyengar  1990 ). Vivid information 
is high on “concreteness,” which includes the “degree of detail 
and specificity about actor, actions, and situational context” 
(Nisbett and Ross 1980, 47). Moreover, vivid information means 
imaginable information that has a “tendency to prompt sensory 
information” (Nisbett and Ross 1980, 47). Across multiple studies, 
such “image-provoking” episodic information has been found 
to be more persuasive than statistical information (Herr, Kardes, 
and Kim  1991 ; Pettus and Diener  1977 ; Zillmann  2006 ). For 
instance, Daschmann experimentally compares the effect of vox 
pop information and a public opinion poll and finds that vox pop 
information is “considerably stronger, to the point of overriding 
the effects of poll results” (2000, 160). Importantly, an overreliance 
on informational vividness is to be considered a bias because 
vividness can be orthogonal to importance, relevance, or some other 
dimension that individuals should care about (Nisbett and Ross 
1980, 62). Drawing on the existing body of evidence regarding the 
effects of vivid information provides a clear expectation as to how 
citizens are affected when exposed to either episodic and statistical 
information:
 Hypothesis 2 : Episodic performance information will have a 
stronger effect on evaluations of public services than statistical 
information describing the same aspect of performance. 
 Another dimension of episodic information is the ability to 
evoke affective and emotional responses beyond what statistical 
information can achieve (Gross  2008 ). Indeed, vivid information 
is often seen as more “emotionally interesting” (Nisbett and 
Ross 1980, 45). As an example, in political communication, 
Aarøe ( 2011 ) finds that an episodic framing of policy changes 
to immigration elicited stronger emotional responses in terms 
of compassion, pity, anger, and disgust. We also find a related 
argument in studies on how statistical information induces “psychic 
numbing” and “compassion fade” (Jenni and Loewenstein  1997 ). 
As Slovic notes, “Numbers fail to spark emotion or feeling and 
thus fail to motivate action” (2007, 80). For instance, we are less 
willing to save “statistical victims” because we find it difficult to be 
emotionally engaged with their suffering and pain. In contrast, we 
often see an “identifiable victim effect,” which denotes an enhanced 
willingness to spend more money on saving the lives of identifiable 
victims rather than statistical lives (Kogut and Ritov  2005 ). We 
expect to find a similar difference in the emotional arousal of 
statistical and episodic information:
 Hypothesis 3 : Episodic information 
about performance is more emotionally 
engaging than statistical information. 
 The final dimension is the recall of episodic 
and statistical information from memory. 
For Nisbett and Ross (1980), an important 
aspect of episodic information ’ s potency is 
that it is more likely to be recalled. Ease of 
recall is consequently part of the explanation 
as to why vivid information can have a 
 Ease of recall is consequently 
part of the explanation as to 
why vivid information can have 
a disproportional eﬀ ect on judg-
ment and evaluations: memo-
rable information will be given 
more weight in judgment. 
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disproportional effect on judgment and evaluations: memorable 
information will be given more weight in judgment. 3 At the same 
time, the fact that vivid information can be more image provoking 
and elicit stronger emotional responses makes it more memorable 
(Taylor and Thomson 1982, 162). 4 A special case involves instances 
from our own lives, which will be even more easily recalled and 
with much greater detail—often referred to as “episodic memory” 
(Tulving  2002 ). Statistical information, on the other hand, is 
marked by the complete opposite characteristics and will be less 
likely to be stored in memory and thus less likely to be retrieved 
for later evaluation. In fact, it has been noted in performance 
management research that numerical performance information 
may be much more difficult to remember (Grosso and Van Ryzin 
 2011 ; Lee  2006 ). For the same reason, early studies of performance 
data argued for the relevance of including photographs and other 
colorful material in order to make the data more memorable 
(Roher  1941 ; Upson  1915 ). Along the same lines, we expect 
a difference in citizens’ ability to recall episodic and statistical 
information:
 Hypothesis 4 : Episodic information is more easily recalled 
and also recalled with greater nuance than statistical 
information about public sector performance. 
 Data and Design: Three Experimental Studies in a 
Nationally Representative Sample 
 The four hypotheses are tested with three experiments using a 
sample of citizens representative of the Danish population. In study 
1, the focus is on citizens’ stated preferences for either statistical 
or episodic performance information when evaluating a public 
service. This allows us to test whether statistical information 
is in fact preferred over episodic information in explicit choice 
situations (hypothesis 1). Study 2 is devoted to the differences 
in how statistical and episodic performance information affect 
citizens’ evaluation of a service (hypothesis 2) and their emotional 
responses to both types of information (hypothesis 3). Finally, 
study 3 addresses differences in the probability and degree of recall 
concerning episodic and statistical information (hypothesis 4). 
 All three experiments were embedded in a large, nationally 
representative sample recruited through YouGov ’ s Danish online 
panel ( n = 1,013). Subjects were randomly assigned to different 
experiments and different treatment conditions within the survey. 
The data were collected in late May 2015 over the course of five 
days. 5 The sample was restricted to citizens between the ages of 
18 and 74 and prestratified on gender, age, geographic region, 
and political party choice in order to achieve a near-representative 
sample of the Danish adult population (50.0 percent female, mean 
age of 46.6 years, and 32.0 percent residing in the capital region). 6 
By applying a large representative sample of the general population, 
we can ensure that any results obtained are externally valid to the 
Danish public at large. Furthermore, by applying a nationally 
representative sample, the results are more easily compared with 
experimental evidence obtained in other contexts and settings. 
 Study 1: Citizens’ Preferences for Statistical and Episodic 
Performance Information 
 The purpose of the first experiment is to determine whether 
citizens prefer episodic or statistical information when asked to 
 Table 1  Experimental Conditions 
 Question for All Subjects: 
 Imagine that you have to evaluate how good or poor a hospital is. You can 
choose one of the two following pieces of information. What would you 
choose? 
 Treatment Conditions (randomly assigned): 
Statistical vs. Case of 
“Former Patient”
Statistical vs. Case of 
“Birgitte”
Statistical vs. Case of 
“Erik” 
( n = 102) ( n = 98) ( n = 107) 
 Results from a satisfaction 
report with 100 former 
patients 
 Results from a satisfaction 
report with 100 former 
patients 
 Results from a satisfaction 
report with 100 former 
patients 
 The experience of a 
former patient 
 The experience that 
51-year-old Birgitte 
had as a patient 
 The experience that 
31-year-old Erik had 
as a patient 
rate a public service (hypothesis 1). The focus is therefore on active 
selection of performance information rather than the effects of 
exposure. 
 Experimental Design and Procedure 
 The experiment is a simple between-subjects design with three 
conditions ( n = 307). All subjects are asked to imagine that they have 
to evaluate the performance of a hospital. In order to do so, they are 
permitted to choose one of two distinct pieces of information. In all 
three conditions, one of the two pieces of information is a report on 
the satisfaction of 100 former patients. It represents a typical form 
of numerical performance data that is usually available to citizens. 
Across the three conditions, the alternative information is one of 
three case stories representing episodic data. One story is about an 
unnamed former patient, while the two other stories involve an 
identifiable older female (“Birgitte”) and a younger male (“Erik”). 
The conditions are described in table  1 . 
 In the experiment, the different forms of episodic conditions are 
employed in order to verify whether potential differences are robust 
across very diverse types of episodic information. An example of 
one of the treatment conditions, as it was shown to the subjects, is 
reported in appendix A. In addition, the order of presentation of 
the two options is randomized for each subject in order to avoid 
sequence effects and keep from implicitly indicating to the subjects 
that one piece of information is more important than the other. 
Subjects had to choose one of the two options in order to proceed in 
the survey. Median response time for the question was 15 seconds. 
The experiment is not necessarily intended to be the optimal way 
of capturing the type of information that citizens  actually draw 
on. Instead, the purpose is to capture what form of performance 
information citizens prefer when asked to make an explicit 
information selection. 
 Empirical Results 
 The results of this experiment are reported in figure  1 . Across all 
three conditions, we find that citizens strongly prefer statistical 
information from the satisfaction survey over the episodic 
description of individual patients. For the condition with an 
unidentifiable former patient, 79.4 percent prefer statistical 
information ( p < .001). For the condition with a 51-year-old woman 
(“Birgitte”), around 87.8 percent prefer statistical information 
( p < .001), and in the 31-year-old male condition (“Erik”), the 
same estimate is 92.5 percent ( p < .001). If we combine all three 
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 Figure 1  Citizens’ Choice of Either Statistical or Episodic 
Performance Information 
 Table 2  Experimental Conditions 
 Information Provided to All Respondents: 
 Imagine that you know the following about a hospital . . . 
 Treatment Conditions (randomly assigned): 
Episodic I: “A Patient” Episodic II: “Birgitte” Episodic III: “Erik” Statistical I: “1%” Statistical II: “10%” 
( n = 142) ( n = 144) ( n = 137) ( n = 139) ( n = 144) 
 A patient was admitted to the 
hospital last year in order to 
have a simple surgery. 
 51-year-old Birgitte was 
admitted to the hospital last 
year in order to have a simple 
surgery. 
 31-year-old Erik was admitted 
to the hospital last year 
in order to have a simple 
surgery done. 
 100 patients were admitted to 
the hospital last year in order 
to have a simple surgery. 
 100 patients were admitted to 
the hospital last year in order 
to have a simple surgery. 
 Following the surgery, the 
patient was in great pain due 
to erroneous treatment. 
 Following the surgery, Birgitte 
was in great pain due to 
erroneous treatment. 
 Following the surgery, Erik 
was in great pain due to 
erroneous treatment. 
 Following the surgery, 1% of 
the patients were in great 
pain due to erroneous 
treatment. 
 Following the surgery, 10% 
of the patients were in 
great pain due to erroneous 
treatment. 
 How good do you think the hospital is? 
 On the Following Page: 
 To what extent does this information make you feel: compassion, disgust, anger 
conditions, then 86.6 percent (confidence interval = 82.2 percent to 
90 percent) of the subjects chose the statistical information. Overall, 
this result provides strong evidence of citizens’ stated preference for 
statistical information over single case stories when directly asked 
to choose between both types information about a public service 
(hypothesis 1). 
 Study 2: Evaluative and Emotional Responses to 
Statistical and Episodic Information 
 Study 1 is a simple test of citizens’ stated preferences for either 
episodic or statistical performance information regarding public 
services. In study 2, we flip the question and ask how citizens’ 
evaluations of public services are affected by either episodic or 
statistical performance information (hypothesis 2). We also look at 
the differences in their emotional responses (hypothesis 3) when 
exposed to either statistical or episodic information. 
 Experimental Design and Procedure 
 The experiment is a between-subjects design with five conditions 
( n = 706). In line with the existing research, our primary test of 
vividness is done by comparing the effects of the three episodic 
treatments with the effects of the two statistical treatments (Kogut 
and Ritov  2005 ; Nisbett and Ross 1980). All subjects are provided 
a piece of performance information about an unnamed hospital, 
as shown in table  2 . The experimental conditions reflect different 
segments of information that subjects can choose in study 1. 
We hereby receive a very direct comparison between differences 
in information  selection and the  effects of randomly assigned 
information exposure. In order to avoid spillover effects, subjects 
from study 1 were excluded from participating in study 2. This is 
because prior knowledge of similar information would most likely 
influence subsequent exposure effects. 
 All five experimental conditions focus on instances of a simple 
surgery performed by a hospital. Hereafter follows a description 
in which a single individual or a sample of patients experience 
serious pain because of an erroneous hospital treatment. Three of 
the conditions are simple case examples with one unidentifiable 
“patient” and two identifiable cases of “Birgitte” and “Erik” (as used 
in study 1). The two identifiable cases are intended to increase the 
vividness of the information by providing concrete details with 
names (and thus indirectly gender) and age. This is a conservative 
manipulation of vividness that draws on similar tests conducted 
in psychological research on identifiable victims (Kogut and Ritov 
 2005 , 161; Slovic  2007 ). The treatment conditions are much more 
subtle than those found in recent studies of episodic framing in 
political psychology. Such cases usually implement colorful and 
emotionally charged language (Aarøe 2011; Gross  2008 ). 
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 The two final conditions present statistical information for 100 
patients from the hospital with varying percentages of them 
experiencing an erroneous hospital treatment (1 percent or 10 
percent). The differing degrees of failure in the two statistical 
treatments provide an indication of how robust the results are if 
episodic information of an erroneous treatment is compared with 
both “mild” (1 percent) and “severe” (10 percent) statistical evidence 
of erroneous treatment. Formally, the “1 percent” treatment also 
only describes erroneous treatment of a single individual (1 patient 
out of 100). Therefore, it is our primary benchmark for a direct 
comparison of the impact of our three episodic treatments that also 
describe the experience of a single individual (hypothesis 2). Across 
all conditions, the descriptions of the surgery and the erroneous 
treatment are held constant in order to only manipulate the form of 
information (i.e., episodic/statistical) and not the actual content. An 
example of one of the treatment conditions, as they were shown to 
the subjects, is reported in appendix B. 
 Beneath the various erroneous treatment descriptions, subjects are 
asked to provide an evaluation of the hospital in question. The 
evaluation is our dependent variable and is provided on a slider 
scale ranging from 0 (“very poor”) to 100 (“very good”), with no 
possibility of not providing a response. Across all conditions, the 
average evaluation is 38.4 (SD = 23.5). Median response time was 
about 17 seconds. The low average evaluation is expected given the 
negative emphasis on “great pain” and “erroneous treatment” across 
all conditions. It underlines that in terms of negative information, 
the experiment was successful in manipulating a negative view of 
the hospital. 
 On the following page, all subjects are asked the extent to which 
the information induced three distinct emotional responses, namely 
“compassion,” “disgust,” and “anger.” These emotional responses 
have been applied in similar studies of episodic and statistical 
information (Aarøe 2011; Gross  2008 ). The three emotions are 
presented in random order for each subject in order to cancel out 
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 Figure 3  Citizens’ Emotional Responses across Five 
Experimental Conditions Describing Erroneous Treatment 
at a Hospital 
any sequence or anchoring effects between emotions. Subjects rate 
the extent to which they feel the three emotions on a 11-point scale 
ranging from “not at all” (0) to “very much” (10). Mean evaluations 
across all conditions indicate that all three emotional responses have 
been activated: compassion (M = 7.1, SD = 2.6), disgust (M = 6.0, 
SD = 3.0), and anger (M = 5.4, SD = 3.1). The median response time 
was about 16.5 seconds. Again, the relative high scores for the three 
negative emotions confirm that, on average, the negative wording 
of the treatment conditions has a negative emotional impact on 
subjects. 
 Empirical Results 
 The findings from study 2 on overall hospital evaluation are 
reported in figure  2 . Here are shown the mean evaluations with 
95 apercent confidence intervals for all treatment conditions. 
The figure shows great variation in average evaluations between 
the episodic and statistical conditions. Each of the three episodic 
conditions causes significantly and substantially lower evaluations 
than the 1 percent statistical condition, which receives the most 
favorable rating of 54.6 points (SD = 24.8). If we combine the 
three single cases and test directly against the 1 percent erroneous 
treatment condition, we obtain an estimate of a 17.8 point lower 
evaluation ( p < .001). The condition with a severe failure rate of 10 
percent receives the lowest evaluation of 27.4 (SD = 20.1), which 
is significantly lower than all of the individual single cases and in 
combination with an estimated difference of 9.5 points ( p < .01). 
However, if we create a combined test, the three single cases receive 
a lower evaluation than the two statistical conditions (3.9 point 
difference,  p < .05). Finally, we note that the two identifiable cases 
receive a slightly lower evaluation than the unidentifiable one—
although the difference is not significant or substantial of magnitude 
(3.6 points,  p = .11). Overall, we note that episodic information has 
a substantially stronger negative impact on citizens’ evaluations of 
public services than statistical information of 1 percent erroneous 
treatment rate out of 100 patients (hypothesis 2). Objectively, 
the statistical information also described the experience of a  single 
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individual (1 percent out of 100 patients), but it did not have 
remotely the same negative impact on evaluations as the episodic 
case descriptions. However, this does not imply that episodic 
information has a greater impact than all levels of statistical evidence 
on the same problem. As an important caveat, we note that if the 
statistical information indicates severe performance problems (i.e., 
10 percent failure rate), then it does have a slightly stronger negative 
impact. 
 Next we turn to the question of how the conditions affected 
citizens’ emotional responses. These results are shown in figure  3 . 
Overall, the results highlight great variation across emotional 
responses between the five conditions. The most striking difference 
is the substantively and significantly higher level of compassion 
across the three single cases when compared with both of the 
statistical conditions. The difference amounts to about 1 point on 
the 11-point scale ( p < .001). For disgust, the combined difference is 
smaller at 0.56 point ( p < .05) and for anger at 0.47 point ( p < .05). 
However, for disgust and anger, the emotional difference is mainly 
driven by the 1 percent erroneous treatment condition. Generally, 
we find less of an effect for disgust and anger when we directly 
compare each of the statistical conditions with the combination 
of the three episodic ones. For compassion, the episodic cases 
have a significantly and substantively greater impact than both 
the 1 percent condition (0.99 point,  p < .001) and the 10 percent 
condition (0.89 point,  p < .001). However, for disgust, there is 
only a difference if the episodic treatments are compared with the 
1 percent condition (1.42 points,  p < .001) but not with the 10 
percent condition (–0.28 point,  p = .33). For anger, the effect also 
only holds for the 1 percent condition (–1.61 points,  p < .001), 
while the 10 percent condition sees a slightly  higher average level of 
anger than the tree episodic frames combined (–0.62 point,  p < .05). 
 In summary, we can note that the episodic information induces 
stronger emotional responses on the  compassion dimension than does 
 any form of statistical information. However, for other emotional 
dimensions episodic information only has a stronger impact than 
the 1 percent statistical information condition (i.e., describing a 
single persons erroneous treatment). Overall, we find some support 
for our hypothesis that episodic information gives a stronger 
emotional response than statistical information (hypothesis 3). 
 Study 3: Immediate Recall of Statistical and Episodic 
Performance Information 
 In study 3, we turn to the question of differences in the recall of 
episodic and statistical information (hypothesis 4). Here we rely on 
a recall task in which subjects are randomly assigned to either recall 
some statistical or episodic information about public services. 
 Experimental Design and Procedure 
 The experiment is a two (episodic/statistical) x three (positive/mixed/
negative) between-subjects design ( n = 674). The wording of the 
treatments in the six groups is outlined in table  3 . An example of one 
of the screens, as it was shown to the subjects, is reported in appendix 
C. In the episodic conditions, subjects are probed with concepts of 
“stories” or “experiences” with public services that are either positive, 
negative, or both (mixed). In the three statistical conditions, subjects 
are asked the same but with regard to “numbers and statistics.” The 
split on negative, positive, and mixed recall is made in order to make 
the findings robust to systematic differences in the valence of the 
episodic and thematic information that citizens recall. 
 In the experiment, subjects are then asked to report what 
immediately comes to their mind in a large text box. Subjects have 
to report  something in order to proceed in the survey. Open-ended 
questions are infrequently applied in survey experiments because 
they can be time-consuming to code and categorize the responses. 
However, the questions are well suited for recording what is on 
the subjects’ minds without making cues in the response scale that 
implicitly link to treatments embedded in the question (RePass 
 1971 ). An alternative way of testing recall would have been to assign 
either episodic or statistical information to citizens at one point in 
time and then later directly ask them to recall the randomly assigned 
information (Aarøe and Petersen  2013 ). 
 In the analysis, we rely on two hand-coded measures of how 
citizens recall and report the information: First, an independent 
coder coded a simple dummy variable indicating whether subjects 
provided a response to the posed question in the treatment 
conditions. The coder was blinded to the treatment conditions 
and was only provided the open-ended responses in random order 
during the coding process. We thereby make sure that the coding 
is independent of knowledge about which treatment condition 
each response belongs to. The coding was done according to the 
following criteria: all responses containing “don ’ t know” replies or 
other indications of inability to recall any information are coded as 
nonresponses. An example of the latter would be if subjects wrote a 
nonsensical string of letters or words. The majority of nonresponses 
was due to the subject writing “can ’ t recall anything” or simply 
“nothing.” If subjects provided some text that responded to the 
task, no matter how short, it was classified as a recall. Across all 
conditions the average share of recalls was 53.6 percent. Second, the 
 Table 3  Experimental Conditions  
 Treatment Conditions (randomly assigned): 
 Episodic  Statistical 
Positive Mixed Negative Positive Mixed Negative 
( n = 107) ( n = 107) ( n = 111) ( n = 116) ( n = 118) ( n = 115) 
 There are many positive 
stories and experiences 
about how good public 
services are in Denmark. 
 There are many positive 
and negative stories 
and experiences about 
how good or bad 
public services are in 
Denmark. 
 There are many negative 
stories and experiences 
about how bad 
public services are in 
Denmark. 
 There are many positive 
numbers and statistics 
about how good public 
services are in Denmark. 
 There are many positive 
and negative numbers 
and statistics about 
how good or bad 
public services are in 
Denmark. 
 There are many negative 
numbers and statistics 
about how bad 
public services are in 
Denmark. 
 Describe the story or experience that immediately comes to mind here in the box 
below: 
 Describe the number or statistic that immediately comes to mind here in the box 
below: 
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independent coder also provided an assessment of the “concreteness” 
and level of detail in each response that was coded. Concreteness is 
coded on an 11-point scale ranging from “not at all concrete” (0) to 
“very concrete” (10). Moreover, the coder was instructed to provide 
higher scores for responses that contain more details. The average 
concreteness for actual recalls across all conditions is 4.7 (SD = 2.1, 
 n = 361). We apply the concreteness measure as a subjective 
indicator of how elaborate the recalled information is. 
 As a robustness check, we also rely on two indirect measures of 
the extent and nuance to the response: First, the number of words 
that each subject applies in their responses was counted. Across 
all conditions, respondents who actually recall information use 
on average 17.3 words and a median of 10 words. Word count 
is used as an alternative measure of how elaborate the responses 
are. This measure is validated by the fact that it is positively and 
significantly correlated with the subjectively coded concreteness 
score (adjusted  R 2 = 0.21,  p < .001). Second, we obtain the response 
time in seconds for each subject. Longer response times have been 
used as an indicator of more thorough processing (Petersen et al. 
 Table 4  Main Results  
 Episodic  Statistical  Difference 
Percent recalling information 63.2% 31.0% 32.1% *** 
( n = 325) ( n = 349) [24.7%–39.6%] 
Mean concreteness of 
response (0–10)
5.3 3.8 1.5 *** 
( n = 228) ( n = 133) [1.1–1.9] 
Mean number of words in 
response
21.2 10.8 10.4 *** 
( n = 228) ( n = 133) [6.0–14.9] 
Trimmed mean response 
latency (sec.)
112.0 77.4 34.6 ** 
( n = 211) ( n = 116) [12.6–56.7]
 Note: Numbers in brackets are 95 percent conﬁ dence intervals. 
 * p < .05;  ** p < .01;  *** p < .001. 
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 Figure 4  Characteristics of the Recalled Information from Open-Ended Respo nses  
 2013 ; Rubinstein  2013 ). The trimmed mean response time for valid 
responses is about 98 seconds. 7 Importantly, the measures capturing 
concreteness, number of words, and response time should be viewed 
as complementary and all serving the same purpose of testing 
whether episodic recall is more elaborate than recall of statistical 
information. If all measures show the same variation across the 
episodic recall conditions relative to the statistical recall conditions, 
this lends more support to hypothesis 4. 
 Empirical Results 
 Results across the treatment groups are reported in table  4 and 
further outlined in figure  4 . First, we look at the percent of 
respondents providing an answer to the inquiry in the treatment text. 
The results show that around twice as many citizens are able to recall 
information when asked about stories or experiences rather than 
when asked about statistics and numbers. The difference in reporting 
is highly significant and confirms the expectation that episodic 
performance information appears more likely to be recalled. 8 
 Next, we examine how elaborate the responses are among those 
citizens who actually provide a response. The first indicator is the 
concreteness coding of the response. Our results show that episodic 
responses have more elaborate details than the statistical ones. On 
average, the concreteness of the episodic recall is 1.5 points higher, 
which is a substantial and significant difference on an 11-point 
scale. The average concreteness of responses across all six groups is 
plotted in figure  4 (left panel). Here, we can see that the difference 
in concreteness between episodic and statistical recall is very 
constant across negative, mixed, and positive responses. 
 The average number of words across all six groups is plotted in right 
panel in figure  4 . In the episodic treatments, citizens use around 
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20 words in their immediate recall of recent stories or experiences 
with public services. This is significantly more and about twice as 
many than citizens use when recalling statistics or numbers about 
public services. Again, we can see that the main difference in word 
usage between episodic and statistical recall is stable across negative, 
positive, and mixed categories. Finally, as a second objective 
indicator of thoughtful and elaborate responses, we can compare 
response latencies across groups for citizens who provided responses. 
These numbers confirm the impression from the concreteness 
coding and the word count: citizens asked to engage in episodic 
recall of public service performance take around 112 seconds (cf. 
table  4 ). This is much longer than those asked to retrieve statistics 
or numbers about public services who take around 77 seconds. 
In summary, we find a very consistent pattern where episodic 
information is more likely to be recalled, and the recall is more 
detailed and elaborate (hypothesis 4). 
 Discussion 
 Results from a survey experiment are limited in terms of their 
external validity across contexts and methods of delivering the 
treatment. However, it is not evident that the differences found in 
this study would be washed out in a real-world setting. In fact, in 
an information-rich environment, we would expect individuals to 
draw even more on vividness cues when sorting through hard and 
soft performance data. That being said, the experimental conditions 
applied in this study would be easy to use in a conceptual 
replication within an actual political-administrative setting. For 
instance, with field experiments, one could test how the very same 
treatment texts affect citizens when delivered as randomly assigned 
government reports with different degrees of episodic and statistical 
information. Another natural extension and test of external 
validity would be to validate other modes of communicating 
vivid performance information. To illustrate, both episodic and 
statistical information could be manipulated in terms of vividness 
by presenting data visualizations or photographs. 
 The results bring forth two important implications for the field of 
study centered on the effects of performance information: First, 
the results question the overall potency of statistical information to 
affect citizens’ evaluations and recall of performance information 
relative to more idiosyncratic and personalized pieces of 
information. Numbers can no doubt be powerful and affect citizens’ 
evaluations of public services. Still, the results 
confront practitioners with the daunting task 
of thinking carefully about how to engage 
citizens with the available performance 
data. As we have already noted, public 
administration scholars acknowledged the 
challenge of balancing “human interest” with 
“dull statistics” early on (Ridley  1937 ; Roher 
 1941 ; Upton 1915). For researchers, the 
results point to the importance of broadening 
the research program on how citizens draw 
inferences from performance information 
about public services. Here, the results tie 
into recent studies that stress how motivated reasoning and prior 
beliefs color citizens’ interpretations of performance data (Bækgaard 
and Serritzlew  2016 ; Marvel  2016 ). With our findings on episodic 
information and the general importance of informational vividness, 
we have yet another obstacle for hard performance data to set its 
mark on the public at large. A natural extension of the findings 
presented here would be to focus on how individual differences 
affect the ways in which citizens draw on episodic and statistical 
information. For instance, numerical ability (numeracy) has been 
identified as an important moderator for how statistical information 
feeds into citizens’ decisions (Peters et al.  2006 ). Furthermore, 
the results might add to our understanding of why research on 
citizen satisfaction often finds that citizens are less satisfied with 
performance at an abstract level than with specific services. One 
possibility is that citizens’ reluctance to draw on statistics implies 
that general service impressions will be affected by unconscious 
biases against public services (Marvel  2016 ). Also, it helps explain 
why measures of citizen satisfaction often are weakly correlated 
with “hard,” objective measures of performance (Stipak  1979 ): if 
citizens mostly rely on experiences and stories, it is more likely that 
their satisfaction with a service will diverge from the general pattern 
captured by a statistical measure of performance. 
 Another important implication of the findings is to understand 
their reach beyond the citizen level. For example, are employees or 
managers affected differently by episodic and statistical information 
than citizens are? Moynihan points to the potential strength of 
human-interest data at the managerial level: “Managers prefer to 
spend their time interacting with people and collecting oral data, 
not contemplating quantitative data” (2008, 167). Another recent 
observational study also points to the fact that mangers often draw 
on nonroutine episodic information (Kroll  2013 ). The obvious 
next step is to make a direct experimental comparison to how 
episodic and statistical information feeds into the decisions made 
by managers, employees, and organizations at large (Olsen  2015b ). 
 Conclusion 
 For better or worse, most scholars agree that numerical performance 
information has a large impact on citizens’ perceptions of public 
services. The findings of this article challenge this belief with 
evidence from a large-scale representative survey experiment. When 
asked to evaluate a public organization, citizens overwhelmingly 
choose statistical information over episodic information. Citizens’ 
stated preferences are geared toward numerical performance 
information. Nonetheless, the subsequent findings highlight that 
the information that citizens  select for performance evaluation is very 
different from the information that actually 
 affects their evaluation and  recall of public 
sector performance. In terms of impact on 
citizens’ evaluations, we find that episodic 
information has a stronger effect when 
compared with statistical information that also 
highlights poor performance experienced by a 
single individual. Only statistical information 
that indicates severe negative performance 
can elicit a stronger negative response than a 
description of a single bad experience. These 
results echo findings in psychology on the 
importance of informational vividness and 
extend into the realm of performance data. The results also highlight 
how statistical information fails to induce an emotional response 
to the same degree that episodic information does. This outcome is 
particularly true for the emotional response of compassion. Finally, 
 In terms of impact on citizens’ 
evaluations, we ﬁ nd that epi-
sodic information has a stronger 
eﬀ ect when compared with 
statistical information that also 
highlights poor performance 
experienced by a single indi-
vidual. 
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when asked to recall either individually based stories or statistical 
facts about the public sector, citizens find it much easier to recall 
the former than the latter. The difference is substantive and spans 
many dimensions. Citizens are much more able to describe stories 
and experiences with greater concreteness than statistics about public 
services. 
 As already noted, the obvious follow-up question is the scope of 
these findings beyond the citizen level. Managers and organizations 
often signal a great interest in hard performance data and spend 
many resources collecting quantitative measures. But perhaps 
managers are no different from the public at large: they state a 
preference for hard numerical data, while in reality, they allow their 
judgments, emotions, and memory to be swayed by the episodic 
information of everyday life. 
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 Notes 
 1 . The use of numbers to impress and signal competence has also been recognized 
as a strategy of politicians in budgetary negotiations (Wildavsky  1964 , 95). 
 2 . Stone ( 2012 ) applies a similar dichotomy by contrasting “symbols” and 
“numbers.” Here, symbols refer to stories and narratives. 
 3 . A similar argument is stressed in the availability bias, which states that 
individuals draw more heavily on exemplars that easily come to mind (Taylor 
and Thomson 1982). 
 4 . In a review, Taylor and Thomson summarize this fundamental difference as 
follows: “Case histories are assumed to be more vivid than their dry statistical 
counterparts (base-rate information) by virtue of the fact that they contain more 
concrete information and more imaginable material than does base-rate 
information. They may also arouse more of an emotional response in the 
perceiver and, for all three of the above reasons, may have a stronger 
representation in memory” (1982, 162). 
 5 . Participating subjects received points, which can be used for purchases and 
lotteries conducted by YouGov. 
 6 . A total of 3,502 subjects were invited to participate in the survey, yielding a 
response rate of 28.9 percent fully completed surveys. 
 7 . We rely on trimmed means where the top and bottom 5 percent are removed. It 
is standard practice to rely on trimmed means, medians, or some other 
transformation for the response time in order to account for some subjects 
spending very long amounts of time (Rubinstein  2013 ). This could happen if 
respondents were to pause in the middle of the survey. 
 8 . An example of a typical recalled  story (translated from Danish) is as follows: “A 
demented female wheelchair user from Svendborg who could not get any 
pension, when the municipality did not think she was ill enough to get any 
pension. Now she is dead.” An example of a typical recalled  statistic would be 
“treatment time in health care.” 
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  Appendix A. Study 1: Example of a Treatment Condition as Viewed By the Subjects in the Survey 
 Note: Statistics versus episodic case of “Birgitte.” “ Imagine that you have to evaluate how good or bad a hospital is. You can choose one of the two following pieces of 
information. What will you choose? ( ) Results from a satisfaction report with 100 former patients. ( ) The experience that 51-year-old Birgitte had as a patient. ” 
  
 Note: Emotional response. “ To what extent does this information make you feel: anger, compassion, disgust. ” 
 Appendix B.  Study 2: Example of a Treatment Condition as Viewed By the Subjects in the Survey 
 Note: Episodic case “Erik.” “ Imagine that you know the following about a hospital: 31-year-old Erik was admitted to the hospital last year in order to have a simple 
surgery done. Following the surgery, Erik was in great pain due to erroneous treatment. How good do you think the hospital is? ”
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 Appendix C.  Study 3: Example of a Treatment Condition as Viewed by the Subjects in the Survey 
 Note: Episodic recall—positive. “ There are many positive stories and experiences with how good public services are in Denmark. Describe the story or experience that 
immediately comes to mind in the box below here: ” 
  
